Editor : Taylor & Francis
ISBN : 9781136819155
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 241
A comprehensive regional study of women in the political executive power.
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A comprehensive regional study of women in the political executive power.
A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.
CIA operative Mitch Rapp investigates an attack on a team of Navy SEALs in the Philippines, searches for a possible State Department traitor, and fights to stop a Middle Eastern assassin out to ignite World War III.
Americans have long treated government accountability as a birthright. However, accountability is frequently tossed about in a rhetorically effective but substantively empty way. We often feel that those in government “work for us” and therefore must “answer to us,” but fail to grapple with the conditions under which we can really assess how accountable our government is. This is especially true with respect to matters of secrecy and transparency in government as, while we routinely voice support for transparency and accountability, we too often tolerate secrecy when associated with “national security.” The government plainly needs to keep some information secret, and there are ways to reconcile secrecy with accountability. In Reclaiming Accountability, unchecked secrecy is the primary concern as insufficient checking breeds unnecessary, even counterproductive, secrecy and is also deeply antithetical to accountability. Heidi Kitrosser shows how, for all of its influence, “presidentialism” badly misreads the Constitution. The book first explains presidentialism and its major component parts – “supremacy” and “unitary executive theory.” It then details how supremacy and unitary executive theory manifest themselves as arguments for a broad presidential power to control information. The descriptive elements lay the groundwork for Kitrosser's two normative arguments. The first is that the Constitution situates the presidency within a substantive accountability framework that entails substantial congressional and judicial leeway to impose and enforce external and internal checks on presidential power to foster transparency and accountability. And, closely related, the second argument is that supremacy and unitary executive theory misread the Constitution.
In many companies, two or three executives jointly hold the responsibilities at the top-from the charismatic CEO who relies on the operational expertise of a COO, to co-CEOs who trust in inter-personal bonds to achieve professional results. Their collaboration is essential if they are to address the dilemmas of the top job and the demands of today's corporate governance. Sharing Executive Power examines the behaviour of such duos, trios and small teams, what roles their members play and how their professional and inter-personal relationships bind their work together. It answers some critical questions regarding when and how such power sharing units form and break up, how they perform and why they endure. Understanding their dynamics helps improve the design and composition of corporate power structures. The book is essential reading for academics, graduates, MBAs, and executives interested in enhancing teamwork and cooperation at the top.
The George W. Bush administration’s ambitious—even breathtaking—claims of unilateral executive authority raised deep concerns among constitutional scholars, civil libertarians, and ordinary citizens alike. But Bush’s attempts to assert his power are only the culmination of a near-thirty-year assault on the basic checks and balances of the U.S. government—a battle waged by presidents of both parties, and one that, as Peter M. Shane warns in Madison’s Nightmare, threatens to utterly subvert the founders’ vision of representative government. Tracing this tendency back to the first Reagan administration, Shane shows how this era of "aggressive presidentialism" has seen presidents exerting ever more control over nearly every arena of policy, from military affairs and national security to domestic programs. Driven by political ambition and a growing culture of entitlement in the executive branch—and abetted by a complaisant Congress, riven by partisanship—this presidential aggrandizement has too often undermined wise policy making and led to shallow, ideological, and sometimes outright lawless decisions. The solution, Shane argues, will require a multipronged program of reform, including both specific changes in government practice and broader institutional changes aimed at supporting a renewed culture of government accountability. From the war on science to the mismanaged war on terror, Madison’s Nightmare outlines the disastrous consequences of the unchecked executive—and issues a stern wake-up call to all who care about the fate of our long democratic experiment.
The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington prompted a "global war on terror" that led to a significant shift in the balance of executive-legislative power in the United States towards the executive at the expense of the Congress. In this volume, seasoned scholars examine the extent to which terrorist threats and counter-terrorism policies led uniformly to the growth of executive or Government power at the expense of legislatures and parliaments in other political systems, including those of Australia, Britain, Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, and Russia. The contributors question whether the "crises" created by 9/11 and subsequent attacks, led inexorably to executive strengthening at the expense of legislatures and parliaments. The research reported finds that democratic forces served to mitigate changes to the balance of legislative and executive power to varying degrees in different political systems. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of Comparative Government Politics and International Politics.
"Presidential power is hotly disputed these days - as it has been many times in recent decades. Yet the same rules must apply to all presidents, those whose abuses of power we fear as well as those whose exercises of power we applaud. This book is about what constitutional law tells us about presidential power and its limits. It is very difficult to strike the right balance between limiting abuse of power and authorizing its exercise when needed. This book advocates a balanced, pragmatic approach to these issues, rooted in history and Supreme Court rulings"--
By revisiting Thomas Jefferson's understanding of executive power this book offers a new understanding of the origins of presidential power. Before Jefferson was elected president, he arrived at a way to resolve the tension between constitutionalism and executive power. Because his solution would preserve a strict interpretation of the Constitution as well as transform the precedents left by his Federalist predecessors, it provided an alternative to Alexander Hamilton's understanding of executive power. In fact, a more thorough account of Jefferson's political career suggests that Jefferson envisioned an executive that was powerful, or 'energetic', because it would be more explicitly attached to the majority will. Jefferson's Revolution of 1800, often portrayed as a reversal of the strong presidency, was itself premised on energy in the executive and was part of Jefferson's project to enable the Constitution to survive and even flourish in a world governed by necessity.
Vital perspectives for the divided Trump era on what the Constitution's framers intended when they defined the extent—and limits—of presidential power One of the most vexing questions for the framers of the Constitution was how to create a vigorous and independent executive without making him king. In today's divided public square, presidential power has never been more contested. The President Who Would Not Be King cuts through the partisan rancor to reveal what the Constitution really tells us about the powers of the president. Michael McConnell provides a comprehensive account of the drafting of presidential powers. Because the framers met behind closed doors and left no records of their deliberations, close attention must be given to their successive drafts. McConnell shows how the framers worked from a mental list of the powers of the British monarch, and consciously decided which powers to strip from the presidency to avoid tyranny. He examines each of these powers in turn, explaining how they were understood at the time of the founding, and goes on to provide a framework for evaluating separation of powers claims, distinguishing between powers that are subject to congressional control and those in which the president has full discretion. Based on the Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, The President Who Would Not Be King restores the original vision of the framers, showing how the Constitution restrains the excesses of an imperial presidency while empowering the executive to govern effectively.