Category : Philosophy
Editor : Wadsworth Publishing Company
ISBN : 0534625576
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 706
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The Twelfth Edition of this best-selling, topically organized anthology provides a superb balance of historical selections and recent material. This new edition features more readings than ever before--79 total--all, where necessary, in the finest translations available. The readings complement each other and naturally build on the topic being covered. Clear, concise introductions to each Part provide just enough guidance to let students learn from experiencing the readings themselves. The text's long-heralded selection of readings covers topics such as reason and religious belief, human knowledge, mind and its place in nature, determinism, free will and responsibility, and morality and its critics in five parts with careful attention to opposing points of view.

Category :
Editor :
ISBN : BNC:1001927189
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 254
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Category : Philosophy
Editor : Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN : 9780199272273
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 388
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Charting the progress of Watson's thought over three decades, this collection of essays on human action examines such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do?.

Category : Philosophy
Editor : Princeton University Press
ISBN : 9781400822737
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 248
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Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I do?" and sifting through alternatives to find the most justifiable course of action--we have reason to hold ourselves responsible for what we do. But when we engage in theoretical reasoning--searching for causal explanations of events--we have no reason to apply concepts like freedom and responsibility. Bok contends that libertarians' arguments against "compatibilist" justifications of moral responsibility fail because they describe human actions only from the standpoint of theoretical reasoning. To establish this claim, she examines which conceptions of freedom of the will and moral responsibility are relevant to practical reasoning and shows that these conceptions are not vulnerable to many objections that libertarians have directed against compatibilists. Bok concludes that the truth or falsity of the claim that we are free and responsible agents in the sense those conceptions spell out is ultimately independent of deterministic accounts of the causes of human actions. Clearly written and powerfully argued, Freedom and Responsibility is a major addition to current debate about some of philosophy's oldest and deepest questions.

Category : Philosophy
Editor : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN : 9781442207394
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 346
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In The Responsibility of Reason, Ralph C. Hancock undertakes no less than to answer the Heideggerian challenge. Offering trenchant and original interpretations of Aristotle, Heidegger, Strauss, and Alexis de Tocqueville, he argues that Tocqueville saw the essential more clearly than apparently deeper philosophers. Hancock addresses political theorists on the question of the grounding of liberalism, and, at the same time, philosophers on the most basic questions of the meaning and limits of reason. Moreover, he shows how these questions are for us inseparable.

Category : Philosophy
Editor : OUP Oxford
ISBN : 9780191622441
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 560
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This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that moral non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.

Category : Philosophy
Editor : Oxford University Press
ISBN : 9780199693818
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 290
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What are our duties or rights? How should we act? What are we responsible for? Joseph Raz examines the philosophical issues underlying these everyday questions. He explores the nature of normativity--the reasoning behind certain beliefs and emotions about how we should behave--and offers a novel account of responsibility.

Category : Philosophy
Editor : OUP USA
ISBN : 9780199740031
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 259
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This book builds upon the work of English philosopher P.F. Strawson, suggesting that moral responsibility is interpersonal and can be explained on analogy with a conversation: the relationship between a responsible agent and those holding him or her responsible is akin to the relationship between a speaker and his or her audience.

Category : Philosophy
Editor : OUP Oxford
ISBN : 9780191062292
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 256
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Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as: · What does it mean to be an agent? · What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)? · What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? · What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility? · How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility? · What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.

Category : Philosophy
Editor : OUP Oxford
ISBN : 9780191655791
Type : PDF, Epub and Kindle
Language : en
Views : 192
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This book explores moral responsibility, and whether it is compatible with causal determinism. Its author, K. E. Boxer, started out with deeply incompatibilist intuitions but became dissatisfied with the arguments that she and other contemporary incompatibilists marshalled in support of this view. Rethinking Responsibility has evolved out of her search for a more adequate argument. Boxer suggests that if incompatibilists are to be in a position to provide such an argument, they must shift their attention away from metaphysics and back to what H. L. A. Hart deemed the primary sense of the concept of moral responsibility, viz., the sense of liability. To say that an agent is morally responsible for an action in this sense is to say that she satisfies the necessary causal and capacity conditions for desert of certain forms of response. If incompatibilists are to show that among those conditions is a requirement for some form of ultimate responsibility incompatible with determinism, they must first clarify their understanding of moral desert and the moral responses associated with attributions of responsibility. The book examines different possible understandings of moral liability-responsibility based on different possible accounts of the nature of moral blame, the moral desert of punishment, and the relation between desert of moral blame and desert of punishment. A focal point throughout the discussion is whether, on any of the possible understandings, moral responsibility would require agents to be ultimately responsible for their actions in a way incompatible with causal determinism. Other issues discussed include what renders a defect a moral defect or a particular criticism a moral criticism, whether moral obligations are act-governing or will-governing, the connection between the moral reactive attitudes and the retributive sentiments, the relevance of the capacity to participate in ordinary interpersonal relationships, and whether it is possible to understand the moral desert of punishment in communicative terms. Boxer concludes that incompatibilists face an unenviable choice: either they must adopt an understanding of the moral desert of punishment that many find morally problematic, or they must abandon incompatibilism.